When your socialist / communist group arms and starts defending themselves and their class interests, what prevents someone labeling them as authoritarian for doing so?
Socialist countries like the PRC lived through a hundred years of imperial exploitation by foreign powers (Britain, the US, and Japan), and fought a decades-long civil war against feudal reactionaries to finally liberate themselves from these oppressions. Do you know something they don’t, about how to establish socialism, “non-authoritarianly”?
Wrong. It was never the norm across China’s economy. It was concentrated in roughly forty large tech firms during the 2016-2019 boom cycle. In August 2021 the Supreme People’s Court explicitly ruled 996 illegal, stating it violates statutory working hour limits and mandatory rest periods. The 2025 Consumption Boost Plan tightens this further with concrete measures against invisible overtime and stronger rest-time guarantees.
capitalists maliciously withholding wages is commonplace
Wage arrears will persist so long as capital exists. That is the unfortunate material reality of the world we live in. What distinguishes China is the enforcement architecture built to counter it. The judgment-defaulter list (失信被执行人) publicly names individuals and companies that fail to comply with court orders on wage payments and debts. Once listed, they face high-consumption restrictions (限制高消费): no business-class travel, no luxury hotels, limits on real estate and vehicle purchases. Combined with the blacklist for owed migrant worker wages and criminal prosecution for willful arrears, this creates real pressure on employers. It is not a perfect system but it is institutional recourse. Compare that to the procedural maze workers navigate in many Western systems when chasing unpaid wages
even establishing a union is treated as a crime
China’s labor framework operates through the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. This isn’t about silencing workers. It is about preventing fragmentation, foreign interference, and ensuring disputes resolve through arbitration and courts rather than adversarial chaos. Enterprise unions under this system negotiate contracts, handle grievances, and oversee safety. The ban on independent unions reflects a choice for unified, state-coordinated representation. That is a policy position. Debate it if you want. But calling it criminalization of worker advocacy is dishonest at best.
those aiding workers in defending their rights are arrested
Vigilante action undermines rule of law anywhere. China channels labor disputes through arbitration committees and courts that handle millions of cases annually. When people bypass legal channels to organize unsanctioned actions, it is the method that triggers enforcement.
Then is the broader picture you ignored. The CPC maintains over 95 percent public approval according to long-term Harvard Kennedy School surveys. Most mainlanders view China’s system as highly democratic because it delivers accountability through performance: poverty alleviation that lifted nearly one billion people, infrastructure built for public benefit not shareholder profit, and anti-corruption enforcement that reaches from village cadres to top generals. The National People’s Congress includes nearly 3,000 deputies with hundreds of farmers, frontline workers, and representatives from all 55 ethnic minorities. That is structural inclusion. When platform capitalists like Jack Ma pushed financialization models that threatened household debt burdens, regulators restructured those businesses toward consumer protection. Similar scrutiny has applied to ed-tech, gaming, and real estate speculation. Public hospitals, high-speed rail, rural broadband. These are not profit centers. They are working-class infrastructure. If your analysis starts from Western media caricatures instead of documented policy and measurable outcomes, you are not critiquing China. You are performing ideology (and poorly at that I might add).
Adding an edit paragraph because I didn’t catch that last bit on my first read of the comment:
On the specific claim about Marxist study groups in schools, let me be precise. I hold a Master’s in Marxist Theory from a Chinese university. Marxism is compulsory coursework from middle school through postgraduate education. The state funds research institutes, journals, and conferences dedicated to this exact subject. What got disbanded were student groups operating outside legal registration requirements, refusing coordination with official university party branches, and using Marxist language to organize unsanctioned actions under the guise of study. That is not a crackdown on theory. It is enforcement of organizational discipline. Socialist democracy operates through democratic centralism: open debate within recognized structures, unified action once decisions are made. When students form parallel groups that reject institutional channels, they are not advancing Marxist practice. They are fracturing the very mechanisms that deliver working-class gains. This is not abstract. Foreign-funded NGOs have a documented history of instrumentalizing campus activism in developing states to destabilize socialist governance. Allowing unregistered groups to mobilize under Marxist rhetoric while bypassing party oversight creates openings for exactly that kind of interference. The result is not worker empowerment. It is system fragmentation that ultimately serves capital and foreign imperialist interests by weakening the coordinated capacity of the socialist state. If you genuinely understood Marxism as taught in China, you would know that the point is not performative dissent. It is building durable working-class power through institutions that can win material concessions. Disbanding unregistered campus groups is not anti-Marxist. It is pro-working-class unity. Your framing assumes that any restriction on organizing is inherently reactionary. That is a liberal assumption, not a socialist one.
It’s important to understand that everything you know about China comes from capitalist states, corporations, and NGOs (which are funded by those states & corporations) that have a vested interest in you believing that there is no viable alternative to capitalism. That’s why the lie to us about China and lied to us about the USSR.
Did you go to China and verify this? Of course not. Everything you know about China comes from imperial core states, corporations, and NGOs (which are funded by those same states & corporations). Over a century of anticommunist propaganda has primed you to believe their narratives.
They have to keep pushing these narratives for the same reason Coca-Cola has to keep advertising their brand, despite already being wildly popular. Advertising/propaganda requires constant maintenance. Previously.
Okay, so you’re an op? Good to know, “Chinese citizen, transfem, formal front-end developer” with a 6 day old account that posts nothing but anti-China slop 👍 The lady doth protest too much.
Can you explain exactly what you mean? It’s a mixture of half-truths and outright lies, and the half-truths deliberately leave out context and reasoning, such as the All-China Federation of Trade Unions existing as a sort of union of unions, China hasn’t made unions illegal. Your entire comment was unsourced, too.
Lmao at you linking chuang. They wouldn’t know good analysis if it punched them in the face. Their characterization of China as state capitalist for example rests on a series of fundamental theoretical errors that constitute a systematic departure from the methodological foundations of scientific socialism. Their analysis proceeds deductively from abstract definitions rather than inductively from concrete investigation, which represents a categorical rejection of the Marxist method as articulated in Marx’s own preface to the second edition of Capital, where he insists that the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in the human mind and translated into forms of thought.
Their primary methodological failure consists in the mechanical application of categories developed for the analysis of mature capitalist formations to a society undergoing socialist transition. They identify the presence of wage labor, commodity exchange, and market mechanisms and conclude that these phenomena constitute definitive proof of capitalist relations of production. This reasoning ignores the dialectical distinction between form and content that is central to Marxist political economy. Under socialism, wage forms may persist while the social content of labor relations undergoes qualitative transformation through the social appropriation of surplus, the subordination of production to planned social objectives, and the institutional mechanisms of workers’ participation in management. Chuang’s refusal to analyze these mediations renders their categorization analytically empty.
Their treatment of political power demonstrates a further departure from historical materialism. Lenin’s decisive contribution to Marxist theory consisted in establishing that the class character of a state is determined not by the legal form of property or the presence of market mechanisms but by which class exercises political command and directs the development of productive forces. Chuang inverts this priority by treating the state as an epiphenomenal expression of economic relations rather than as the concentrated instrument of class power. This theoretical error leads them to dismiss the substantive significance of the Communist Party of China’s strategic control over finance, land, energy, telecommunications, and heavy industry, as well as its capacity to direct investment toward socially determined priorities such as poverty alleviation, regional development, and technological sovereignty.
Their analysis of China’s integration into the world economy exhibits a crude economic determinism that Marx explicitly criticized in his polemics against the vulgar materialists. They assert that participation in global markets necessarily entails subordination to the law of value on a world scale, thereby erasing the mediating role of state capacity, capital controls, industrial policy, and strategic planning. This position ignores the extensive theoretical and practical work of Marxist-Leninist movements on the question of socialist engagement with imperialist economies. Lenin’s writings on the NEP, Mao’s analyses of New Democracy, and subsequent CPC theoretical developments all recognize that tactical engagement with market mechanisms and international trade can serve socialist construction when subordinated to proletarian political leadership and long-term planning objectives. Chuang’s categorical rejection of this strategic framework reflects not theoretical rigor but sectarian dogmatism.
Their conception of transition reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the dialectical character of socialist development. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mao all theorized socialism as a prolonged historical process characterized by the coexistence and struggle of old and new relations of production. The presence of contradictory elements does not constitute evidence of capitalist restoration but rather reflects the uneven and contested character of revolutionary transformation. Chuang’s binary framework, which demands either pure socialism or explicit capitalism, rejects this core insight and substitutes utopian abstraction for concrete analysis. Their method cannot account for the actual trajectory of China’s development, including the expansion of public ownership, the strengthening of social welfare systems, the reduction of inequality, and the advancement of technological capacity under conditions of imperialist encirclement.
Their analytical framework also fails to engage with the concrete mechanisms through which surplus is appropriated and allocated in China. Scientific socialism requires investigation of the actual flows of value, the institutional structures of planning and distribution, and the social outcomes of economic policy. Chuang bypasses this empirical work in favor of categorical assertion. They do not demonstrate that surplus value in China is privately appropriated in the manner characteristic of capitalist exploitation. They do not establish that investment decisions are governed by profit maximization rather than social planning criteria. They do not analyze the role of mass organizations, workplace democracy, or community participation in shaping economic outcomes. Their conclusion rests not on material investigation but on definitional fiat.
The political consequence of Chuang’s theoretical errors is a politics of sectarian negation that substitutes moral condemnation for strategic analysis. Scientific socialism is not concerned with issuing abstract verdicts on historical processes but with identifying contradictions, assessing balances of forces, and advancing class struggle through concrete practice. Chuang’s refusal to engage with the actual gains achieved by China’s development model, including the lifting of hundreds of millions from poverty, the expansion of public infrastructure, and the strengthening of national sovereignty against imperialist pressure, reveals a politics disconnected from the material interests of the international working class. Their analysis serves not to advance socialist theory but to reinforce the ideological boundaries of a particular academic-leftist milieu that prioritizes theoretical purity over revolutionary effectiveness.
In sum, Chuang’s characterization of China as state capitalist is not a contribution to Marxist analysis but a deviation from its foundational method. Their deductive formalism, their erasure of political power as a determinant of social relations, their mechanical application of categories, and their rejection of transitional dialectics collectively constitute a systematic departure from scientific socialism. The result is not sharper critique but theoretical error that obscures rather than clarifies the actual character of contemporary socialist construction. If one seeks to understand China’s development, one must begin with concrete investigation of its material practices, institutional structures, and historical trajectory, not with predefined definitions imposed from without. Anything less is not Marxist analysis but its caricature.
If chuang is the basis of your political thoughts on China it is no wonder you have also arrived at the wrong conclusions.
There’s a massive difference between the claim that “996 is the norm” and the reality that this was largely restricted to large tech companies, is acknowledged as a real problem by the government, and that said government has taken concrete steps towards eliminating this entirely. Of course, reality is not black and white, just because something is formally illegal does not mean that it has been eliminated entirely, but this is a universe apart from the claim that “996 is the norm.”
Regarding the question of whether trade unions should be independent or incorporated and federated, historical practice proves the necessity of unity over fragmentation. The Jasic incident actually demonstrates this quite well, as western organizations such as BBC, Amnesty International, and Radio Free Asia got involved in the incident and tried to spin it. Preventing western influence over soveriegn structures is critical to the longevity of the socialist peoject, and the fact that unions must work within the existing socialist system is miles apart from the claim that “unions are illegal.”
As for students discarding what of Marxism they learn, this isn’t unexpected. No socialist country can manage to make all students interested in Marxism. Your claim, however, made it appear that Marxism itself is discouraged. Regarding the Peking University Marxist Society, the students had this to say:
As one of the students told The Washington Post, they believe “Once you study Marxism, you know real socialism and China’s so-called socialism with Chinese characteristics are two different things. They sell fascism as socialism as a street vendor passes off dog meat as lamb.”
This is not Marxist analysis, this is left-dogmatism. In the PRC, public ownership is the principle aspect of the economy, and the working classes have political control of the state, not capitalists. The accusation of fascism is coated in Marxist analysis, but is ultimately left-deviationism and counter-revolutionary. Their accusation is ironic, and just like the Jasic incident, it is the exact type of fragmentation that undermines socialist construction through left phrasemongering and coating.
The claim that western orgs are reluctant to cover China’s working conditions is utter fantasy. In the west, we are drilled with propaganda about conditions in China daily. There is a real information war against China waged daily in the west. I’m aware that China is rife with contradictions, such is the result of a rapidly developing country trying to navigate ongoing class warfare, urban/rural mismatched development, problems arising from the existence of liberals and capitalists in China empowered by Reform and Opening Up, and more. However, the PRC is constantly and regularly improving, the state enjoys approval rates exceding 90%, and the CPC is regularly addressing the real issues in China.
Overall, your framing is highly deceptive. Rather than discussing real problems honestly, you try to hide their context, complexity, and nuance. This isn’t a Marxist method of problem solving and discussion, there’s no adherance to unity-struggle-unity. A discussion base built on deception is pointless, theory and practice must be united to be accurate and effective.
China IS authoritarian.
I’m not a liberal, I’m a libertarian socialist/communist.
When your socialist / communist group arms and starts defending themselves and their class interests, what prevents someone labeling them as authoritarian for doing so?
Socialist countries like the PRC lived through a hundred years of imperial exploitation by foreign powers (Britain, the US, and Japan), and fought a decades-long civil war against feudal reactionaries to finally liberate themselves from these oppressions. Do you know something they don’t, about how to establish socialism, “non-authoritarianly”?
It’s a good thing for the working classes to wield state authority against capitalists. Not sure what you mean by “libertarian socialist/communist.”
Removed by mod
You lived in China for 28 years and claim that ”the 996 work schedule is the norm”?
Yeah, you’re an op. GTFO.
Wrong. It was never the norm across China’s economy. It was concentrated in roughly forty large tech firms during the 2016-2019 boom cycle. In August 2021 the Supreme People’s Court explicitly ruled 996 illegal, stating it violates statutory working hour limits and mandatory rest periods. The 2025 Consumption Boost Plan tightens this further with concrete measures against invisible overtime and stronger rest-time guarantees.
Wage arrears will persist so long as capital exists. That is the unfortunate material reality of the world we live in. What distinguishes China is the enforcement architecture built to counter it. The judgment-defaulter list (失信被执行人) publicly names individuals and companies that fail to comply with court orders on wage payments and debts. Once listed, they face high-consumption restrictions (限制高消费): no business-class travel, no luxury hotels, limits on real estate and vehicle purchases. Combined with the blacklist for owed migrant worker wages and criminal prosecution for willful arrears, this creates real pressure on employers. It is not a perfect system but it is institutional recourse. Compare that to the procedural maze workers navigate in many Western systems when chasing unpaid wages
China’s labor framework operates through the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. This isn’t about silencing workers. It is about preventing fragmentation, foreign interference, and ensuring disputes resolve through arbitration and courts rather than adversarial chaos. Enterprise unions under this system negotiate contracts, handle grievances, and oversee safety. The ban on independent unions reflects a choice for unified, state-coordinated representation. That is a policy position. Debate it if you want. But calling it criminalization of worker advocacy is dishonest at best.
Vigilante action undermines rule of law anywhere. China channels labor disputes through arbitration committees and courts that handle millions of cases annually. When people bypass legal channels to organize unsanctioned actions, it is the method that triggers enforcement.
Then is the broader picture you ignored. The CPC maintains over 95 percent public approval according to long-term Harvard Kennedy School surveys. Most mainlanders view China’s system as highly democratic because it delivers accountability through performance: poverty alleviation that lifted nearly one billion people, infrastructure built for public benefit not shareholder profit, and anti-corruption enforcement that reaches from village cadres to top generals. The National People’s Congress includes nearly 3,000 deputies with hundreds of farmers, frontline workers, and representatives from all 55 ethnic minorities. That is structural inclusion. When platform capitalists like Jack Ma pushed financialization models that threatened household debt burdens, regulators restructured those businesses toward consumer protection. Similar scrutiny has applied to ed-tech, gaming, and real estate speculation. Public hospitals, high-speed rail, rural broadband. These are not profit centers. They are working-class infrastructure. If your analysis starts from Western media caricatures instead of documented policy and measurable outcomes, you are not critiquing China. You are performing ideology (and poorly at that I might add).
Adding an edit paragraph because I didn’t catch that last bit on my first read of the comment:
On the specific claim about Marxist study groups in schools, let me be precise. I hold a Master’s in Marxist Theory from a Chinese university. Marxism is compulsory coursework from middle school through postgraduate education. The state funds research institutes, journals, and conferences dedicated to this exact subject. What got disbanded were student groups operating outside legal registration requirements, refusing coordination with official university party branches, and using Marxist language to organize unsanctioned actions under the guise of study. That is not a crackdown on theory. It is enforcement of organizational discipline. Socialist democracy operates through democratic centralism: open debate within recognized structures, unified action once decisions are made. When students form parallel groups that reject institutional channels, they are not advancing Marxist practice. They are fracturing the very mechanisms that deliver working-class gains. This is not abstract. Foreign-funded NGOs have a documented history of instrumentalizing campus activism in developing states to destabilize socialist governance. Allowing unregistered groups to mobilize under Marxist rhetoric while bypassing party oversight creates openings for exactly that kind of interference. The result is not worker empowerment. It is system fragmentation that ultimately serves capital and foreign imperialist interests by weakening the coordinated capacity of the socialist state. If you genuinely understood Marxism as taught in China, you would know that the point is not performative dissent. It is building durable working-class power through institutions that can win material concessions. Disbanding unregistered campus groups is not anti-Marxist. It is pro-working-class unity. Your framing assumes that any restriction on organizing is inherently reactionary. That is a liberal assumption, not a socialist one.
Yea you completely blew my comment away, lol. Great info, thanks for writing this up! 🫡
I wouldn’t say that I think it’s a great strength for you to be able to be as concise as you were while still hitting the key points.
Thank you!
It’s important to understand that everything you know about China comes from capitalist states, corporations, and NGOs (which are funded by those states & corporations) that have a vested interest in you believing that there is no viable alternative to capitalism. That’s why the lie to us about China and lied to us about the USSR.
Removed by mod
Did you go to China and verify this? Of course not. Everything you know about China comes from imperial core states, corporations, and NGOs (which are funded by those same states & corporations). Over a century of anticommunist propaganda has primed you to believe their narratives.
They have to keep pushing these narratives for the same reason Coca-Cola has to keep advertising their brand, despite already being wildly popular. Advertising/propaganda requires constant maintenance. Previously.
Removed by mod
Okay, so you’re an op? Good to know, “Chinese citizen, transfem, formal front-end developer” with a 6 day old account that posts nothing but anti-China slop 👍 The lady doth protest too much.
Maybe the anti-China bots are trying to up their game.
Lol this is like ngo concern troll bingo. Be specific, name the marginalized communities
996 was declared illegal in 2021, and was mainly in large tech companies, certainly not the norm even before 2021. Meanwhile, the state executes billionaires and capitalists found guilty of corruption. Unions are entirely legal, they just have to be a part of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, and not rogue. Marxism is studied in China, you can even get a college degree in it. Workers and students and their rights are defended and protected by the socialist system.
Can you explain exactly what you mean? It’s a mixture of half-truths and outright lies, and the half-truths deliberately leave out context and reasoning, such as the All-China Federation of Trade Unions existing as a sort of union of unions, China hasn’t made unions illegal. Your entire comment was unsourced, too.
Removed by mod
Lmao at you linking chuang. They wouldn’t know good analysis if it punched them in the face. Their characterization of China as state capitalist for example rests on a series of fundamental theoretical errors that constitute a systematic departure from the methodological foundations of scientific socialism. Their analysis proceeds deductively from abstract definitions rather than inductively from concrete investigation, which represents a categorical rejection of the Marxist method as articulated in Marx’s own preface to the second edition of Capital, where he insists that the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in the human mind and translated into forms of thought.
Their primary methodological failure consists in the mechanical application of categories developed for the analysis of mature capitalist formations to a society undergoing socialist transition. They identify the presence of wage labor, commodity exchange, and market mechanisms and conclude that these phenomena constitute definitive proof of capitalist relations of production. This reasoning ignores the dialectical distinction between form and content that is central to Marxist political economy. Under socialism, wage forms may persist while the social content of labor relations undergoes qualitative transformation through the social appropriation of surplus, the subordination of production to planned social objectives, and the institutional mechanisms of workers’ participation in management. Chuang’s refusal to analyze these mediations renders their categorization analytically empty.
Their treatment of political power demonstrates a further departure from historical materialism. Lenin’s decisive contribution to Marxist theory consisted in establishing that the class character of a state is determined not by the legal form of property or the presence of market mechanisms but by which class exercises political command and directs the development of productive forces. Chuang inverts this priority by treating the state as an epiphenomenal expression of economic relations rather than as the concentrated instrument of class power. This theoretical error leads them to dismiss the substantive significance of the Communist Party of China’s strategic control over finance, land, energy, telecommunications, and heavy industry, as well as its capacity to direct investment toward socially determined priorities such as poverty alleviation, regional development, and technological sovereignty.
Their analysis of China’s integration into the world economy exhibits a crude economic determinism that Marx explicitly criticized in his polemics against the vulgar materialists. They assert that participation in global markets necessarily entails subordination to the law of value on a world scale, thereby erasing the mediating role of state capacity, capital controls, industrial policy, and strategic planning. This position ignores the extensive theoretical and practical work of Marxist-Leninist movements on the question of socialist engagement with imperialist economies. Lenin’s writings on the NEP, Mao’s analyses of New Democracy, and subsequent CPC theoretical developments all recognize that tactical engagement with market mechanisms and international trade can serve socialist construction when subordinated to proletarian political leadership and long-term planning objectives. Chuang’s categorical rejection of this strategic framework reflects not theoretical rigor but sectarian dogmatism.
Their conception of transition reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the dialectical character of socialist development. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mao all theorized socialism as a prolonged historical process characterized by the coexistence and struggle of old and new relations of production. The presence of contradictory elements does not constitute evidence of capitalist restoration but rather reflects the uneven and contested character of revolutionary transformation. Chuang’s binary framework, which demands either pure socialism or explicit capitalism, rejects this core insight and substitutes utopian abstraction for concrete analysis. Their method cannot account for the actual trajectory of China’s development, including the expansion of public ownership, the strengthening of social welfare systems, the reduction of inequality, and the advancement of technological capacity under conditions of imperialist encirclement.
Their analytical framework also fails to engage with the concrete mechanisms through which surplus is appropriated and allocated in China. Scientific socialism requires investigation of the actual flows of value, the institutional structures of planning and distribution, and the social outcomes of economic policy. Chuang bypasses this empirical work in favor of categorical assertion. They do not demonstrate that surplus value in China is privately appropriated in the manner characteristic of capitalist exploitation. They do not establish that investment decisions are governed by profit maximization rather than social planning criteria. They do not analyze the role of mass organizations, workplace democracy, or community participation in shaping economic outcomes. Their conclusion rests not on material investigation but on definitional fiat.
The political consequence of Chuang’s theoretical errors is a politics of sectarian negation that substitutes moral condemnation for strategic analysis. Scientific socialism is not concerned with issuing abstract verdicts on historical processes but with identifying contradictions, assessing balances of forces, and advancing class struggle through concrete practice. Chuang’s refusal to engage with the actual gains achieved by China’s development model, including the lifting of hundreds of millions from poverty, the expansion of public infrastructure, and the strengthening of national sovereignty against imperialist pressure, reveals a politics disconnected from the material interests of the international working class. Their analysis serves not to advance socialist theory but to reinforce the ideological boundaries of a particular academic-leftist milieu that prioritizes theoretical purity over revolutionary effectiveness.
In sum, Chuang’s characterization of China as state capitalist is not a contribution to Marxist analysis but a deviation from its foundational method. Their deductive formalism, their erasure of political power as a determinant of social relations, their mechanical application of categories, and their rejection of transitional dialectics collectively constitute a systematic departure from scientific socialism. The result is not sharper critique but theoretical error that obscures rather than clarifies the actual character of contemporary socialist construction. If one seeks to understand China’s development, one must begin with concrete investigation of its material practices, institutional structures, and historical trajectory, not with predefined definitions imposed from without. Anything less is not Marxist analysis but its caricature.
If chuang is the basis of your political thoughts on China it is no wonder you have also arrived at the wrong conclusions.
There’s a massive difference between the claim that “996 is the norm” and the reality that this was largely restricted to large tech companies, is acknowledged as a real problem by the government, and that said government has taken concrete steps towards eliminating this entirely. Of course, reality is not black and white, just because something is formally illegal does not mean that it has been eliminated entirely, but this is a universe apart from the claim that “996 is the norm.”
Regarding the question of whether trade unions should be independent or incorporated and federated, historical practice proves the necessity of unity over fragmentation. The Jasic incident actually demonstrates this quite well, as western organizations such as BBC, Amnesty International, and Radio Free Asia got involved in the incident and tried to spin it. Preventing western influence over soveriegn structures is critical to the longevity of the socialist peoject, and the fact that unions must work within the existing socialist system is miles apart from the claim that “unions are illegal.”
As for students discarding what of Marxism they learn, this isn’t unexpected. No socialist country can manage to make all students interested in Marxism. Your claim, however, made it appear that Marxism itself is discouraged. Regarding the Peking University Marxist Society, the students had this to say:
This is not Marxist analysis, this is left-dogmatism. In the PRC, public ownership is the principle aspect of the economy, and the working classes have political control of the state, not capitalists. The accusation of fascism is coated in Marxist analysis, but is ultimately left-deviationism and counter-revolutionary. Their accusation is ironic, and just like the Jasic incident, it is the exact type of fragmentation that undermines socialist construction through left phrasemongering and coating.
The claim that western orgs are reluctant to cover China’s working conditions is utter fantasy. In the west, we are drilled with propaganda about conditions in China daily. There is a real information war against China waged daily in the west. I’m aware that China is rife with contradictions, such is the result of a rapidly developing country trying to navigate ongoing class warfare, urban/rural mismatched development, problems arising from the existence of liberals and capitalists in China empowered by Reform and Opening Up, and more. However, the PRC is constantly and regularly improving, the state enjoys approval rates exceding 90%, and the CPC is regularly addressing the real issues in China.
Overall, your framing is highly deceptive. Rather than discussing real problems honestly, you try to hide their context, complexity, and nuance. This isn’t a Marxist method of problem solving and discussion, there’s no adherance to unity-struggle-unity. A discussion base built on deception is pointless, theory and practice must be united to be accurate and effective.